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IN THE 
SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
FR~-\.XK E. DOLE, I 
PlaiJitiff, 
YS. 
S~-\.LT LAKE LAU~DRY, THE 
INDUSTRIAL CO~I~IISSIO~ 
OF l'"TAH and THE STATE 
IXSL"RANCE FUND, 
Defendants. 
No. 7157 
DEFENDANTS' BRIEF 
STATE~IEXT 
On ~lay 28. 1947. Frank E. D'Ole filed an application 
with the Industrial Con1n1ission of Utah in which he 
alleged that he had sustained an accidental injury on 
~larch 26, 1946, while he \\~af' in the Plnploy of the Salt 
Lake Laundry as its manager. In his application and in 
his testimony at the Industrial Commission hearing he 
stated that his accident consisted of a severe jolting 
while he ,,~as driving his automobile on Red-wood Road 
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going from Salt Lake City to Kearns, Utah, on business 
of the Sa1t Lake Laundry. He claimed that he received 
a detached retina in his right eye as a result of this 
severe jolting, which eventually resulted in total blind-
ness of the eye. After hearing the case, the Industrial 
Commission rendered i.ts decision on December 3, 1947, 
in which the Oommission denied Mr. Dole's application 
for compensation. Mr. Dole, through his attorney, has 
brought the case to the Supreme Court of Utah and has 
attacked the Industrial Commission's decision as being 
erroneous and illegal. 
The 8taten1ent of Facts contained in the first part 
of Plaintiff's brief fairly summarizes most of the testi-
mony found in the transcript of evidence. However it 
also contains numerous comments by Plaintiff's counsel 
relating to portions of the .testimony. Naturally, we do 
not concede that eounsel 's con1ments should be given the 
same weight as the witnesses' testimony. 
ARGU~1ENT 
In its decision the Indus·trial Commission said that 
it was "not convinced that the applicant sustained an 
injury arising out of or in the course of his emploJinent 
on the date as alleged by applicant on March 26, 1946, 
and therefore finds .that the application should be de-
nied.'' This amounted, in substance and effect, to a find-
ing that Mr. Dole did not sustain a compensable acciden-
tal injury arising out of or in the course of his employ-
ment. As a basis for this conclusion, we refer to the case 
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'3 
of Thontp~oll r~. Industrial ('om mission, lwn·inafh•r 
cited. 
In order for the Plaintiff to havt' any justification 
for requesting the Supreine Court to annul the Industrial 
Conuuission 's decision, he n1ust establish 
(1) that the Industrial Con1n1issi~n "·as required, 
as a matter of la"·· to find that ~Ir. Dole did sustain an 
accidental injury on March 26. 1946, arising out of or 
in the course of his en1ployn1ent. 
and 
(:2) that the Industrial Commission was required 
as a matter of law to find that said accidental injury was 
the cause of, or was a material factor in causing, the 
eventual detached retina which resulted in Mr. Dole's 
loss of sight in his right eye. 
POINT 1. 
THE -INDUSTRIAL COJ\LMISSION vYAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO FIXD THAT MR. DOLE SUS-
TAINED AX ACCIDENTAL INJURY IN HIS EM-
PLOY:JIEXT OX ~IARCH 26, 1946. 
POINT 2. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COM~IISSION \YAS NOT 
REQUIRED TO FIND THAT THE APPLICANT'S 
DETACHED RETINA \YAS CAUSED BY AN ACCI-
DE~T IN THE COURSE OF HIS EMPLOYMENT. 
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These two points are so intenY'OVen that \Ye shall 
consider them together. In this brief we shall refer to · 
the transcript of the Industrial Comn1ission 's hearing 
held June 24, 1947, as 1 Tr. We shall refer to the tran-
script of the Industrial Comn1ission 's hearing held No-
vember 14, 1947, as 2 Tr. 
One discrepancy in .Jlr. Dole's statements appears in 
the record as follows: In his testim,ony Dole said that 
on .March 26, 1946, while driving his automobile on Red-
wood Road he went over a very rough pieee of road and 
imn1ediately his right eye went blind. He sa1d he went 
to Dr. Saunders the follmving n1orning, Dr. Saunders 
exan1ined the eye and asked him how it happened (1 Tr. 
5). But Dr. Saunders testified quite definitely that when 
~Ir. Dole can1e to see him on March 27, 1946, he conl-
plained of blurring vision in his right eye. Dr. Saunders 
examined the eye that day and also the following day, 
March 28, 1946, and he found that Mr. Dole had 20-30 
vision in his right eye, which is substantially normal 
vision (1 Tr. 17 & 18). Dr. Saunders further stated that 
~lr. Dole did not say anything to him ~bout any trip 
on the highway or about any violent shaking. Dr. Saun-
ders said he did not recall that there '''as any mention 
made of any specific instance where all of a sudden the 
eye seen1ed to lose its vision. (1 Tr. 18 & 19). Dr. Saun-
ders said he saw a degenerative process in the eye, a 
gradual developn1ent of a degenerative process (1 Tr. 
20). He said that about April 25th Dole's vision in the 
right eye was down to 20-70 (1 Tr. 20). Dr. Saunders 
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further te~tified that if .Mr. Dole had suffen'd a retinal 
detachn1ent at the tin1e of the alleged shakeup on Mnreh 
~G. 1946. yon would have expected an innnediate loss of 
vision and you would not have found a 20-30 v~sion the 
next day. That mnount of vision indicated that there 
wa~ no detached retina at that tin1e (1 Tr. 27). 
In his testiinony ~[r. D.ole stated that he was all 
alone in his autonwbile when the alleged accident oc-
ctured. Therefore, his own staten1ents, both when he 
was testifying before the Industrial Comn1ission and also 
the statements which he n1ade to various doctors many 
months after ~Iarch 2G, 1946, are the only evidence in 
the record upon the basis ,of which there could have been 
any finding that he had sustained an accidental injury 
on the date and in the manner he alleged. 
\Ye should not need to cite more than a few decisions 
of the Supreme Court of Utah to show adequate ~egal 
support for sustaining the Industrial Commission's order 
denying compensation in this case. -
In the case of Gagos vs. Industrial Commission, 87 
Utah 101, 48 Pae. (2nd) 449, the Court's opinion con-
tains the following: 
''The fact finder is not always required ,to 
believe the uncontradicting evidence of a witness, 
as will be seen from the text and the cases cited 
in support thereof in 23 C. J. p. 47, sec. 1791. 
There are a number of facts and circumstances in 
the ins,tant case which may have caused the com-· 
n1ission to disbelieve the testimony of Mr. Gagos. 
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He was interested in the result of the controversy. 
* * *" 
In the n1ore recent case ·of Smith vs. Industrial ConL-
mission, 104 Utah 318, 140 Pac. (2nd) 314, the prevailing 
opinion of the Court concludes with these words: 
"This indicates that where the evidence is 
·wholly that of an interested witness the trier of 
fact may reasonably refuse to believe it. Of 
course, the fact that a witness is corr,oborated on 
one point does not require the trier of fact to be-
lieve him on o,ther material points where there is 
no corroboration. In view of the fact that appli-
cant was the only witness to· testify to the accident, 
to the resultting sensations, and to his reasons for 
not reporting it to his employer, and the further 
fact that these facts were by their very nature 
exclusively within his own knowledge and ,there-
fore could not be controverted by other testimony, 
the·commission could reasonably refuse to believe 
his testimony, which they apparently did." 
The case of Vecchio vs. Ind. Comm. was brought to 
the Supren1e Court two different times. The Court's 
first decis:Von is found at 82 Utah 128, 22 Pac. (2nd) 212. 
The Industrial Commission had held a hearing on J anu-
ary 1, 1932, regarding Mrs. Vecchio's claim for con1pen-
sation on account of the death of her husband. It was 
apparent from the Conm1ission's decision that the Con1-
1nission had the erroneous idea that certain res gestae 
testimony was inadn1issible as being hearsay evidence. 
Consequently the Supreme Court_ reversed the Connnis-
sion 's decision and re1nanded the case for fu.rther pro-
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ceedings. Thereafter the Commission held anoth<>r l~<·n r-
ing at which the te~tinumy of the pn'Yious hearing wa~ 
again plaeed in evidence a~ \Yl'll as additional Pvid<'lWP. 
The Con11nission again denied the application for COlll-
pensation. )[r~. Yecchio again took tlw case to the Su-
prenw Court. which rendered its decision at 84 Utah 528, 
37 Pac. ( :?nd) 3-!:?. In this later decision, the Supreine 
Court sustained the Industrial Con11nission 's denial of 
compensation. In the last paragraph of the Oourt 's opin-
ion is found the following: 
··The Commission n1ay well have believed 
that it was in1probable that the injury in question 
\Yas received by the deceased bun1ping his leg 
against the motor of the car as claimed by plain-
tiff. The nature of the injury, the statements of 
)Ir. Y ecchio to the doctors after he was injured, 
the position of the n1otor on the car, all tend to 
rebut plaintiff's claim in such respect. By a long 
line of decisions this court has uniformly held 
they will not disapprove findings made by the 
Commission on conflieting evidence. That this 
court is without authority in such case to interfere 
with the Commission's finding is expressly pro-
vided by our Industrial Act, Rev. St. Utah 1933, 
42-1-79. '' 
Crane vs . .Ind. Comm., 97 Utah 244, 92 Pac. (2nd) 
722. On April 4, 1938, ~lr. Crane fell while he was at 
work in his employer's n1ine, and injured his back and 
knee. He continued to work until May 7th, on which 
date his leg was red and swollen and ached considerably. 
He was sxamined by a do-ctor on 1\Iay lOth and his knee 
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was found to be seriously affec-ted. On :May 14th a core 
was taken from the knee. After a hearing, the Indus-
,trial Cmnmission denied his claim for compensation and 
the Supreme Court sustained the Commission's decision. 
In its decision the Court quoted the foUowing language 
from the Kent, Parker and Hutchings cases: 
Kellt vs. !Jidustrial Commision, 89 Utah 381, 57 Pac. 
(2nd) 724. 
"In the case of denial of compensation, the 
record must disclose that there is n1aterial, sub-
stantial, co1npetent, uncontradicted evidence suf-
ficient to make a disregard of it justify the con-
clusion, as a matter of law, that the Indush·ial 
Commission arbitrarily and capriciously disre-
garded the evidence or unreasonably refused to 
believe such evidence. * * * When we are 
asked to overturn the findings and conclusions 
of the cmnmission denying compensation, it must 
be n1ade clearly to appear that the commission 
acted wholly without cause in rejecting or in re-
fusing to believe or give effect to the evidence. It 
is not intended by the \Yorkmen 's Compensation 
Act (Rev. Ht. 1933, 42-1-1 et seq:) that this court, 
in 1natters of evidence, should to any extent sub-
stitute the judgn1ent of the court upon factual 
matters for the judgn1ent of the commission.'' 
Parl-ceT vs. Incl. Comm., 78 Utah 509, 5 Pac. (2d) 573. 
•' This court is not authorized to weigh con-
flicting evidence, nor is it authorized to direct 
which one of two or n1ore reasonable inferences 
must be drawn frmn evidence which is riot in con-
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flict. That i~ the peculiar pnH'ince of tlw Indus .. 
trial l \mnnission. ·' 
Hutclli1198 1\':. Ind. CoJJI/11., 9() Utah 399, 87 l)ne. 
(2nd) 11. 
· · ~-\nd ~o it has been held in nnm<>rous cases 
that the decision of the Industrial Con1mission 
will not be disturbed "·here the evidence was such 
that the Con11nissiou could reasonably find or con-
clude that the death or disability of the mnplo~·ee 
was not the result of accidental injury arising ·out 
of or in the course of en1ployn1ent. '' 
Taggart rs. Ind. Comm., 79 Utah 598, 12 Pac. (2nd) 
356. Taggart worked for Sperry Flour C01npany. He 
died on April 27. 1931. as a result (according to his 
widow's claim) ·of a weakened heart condition resulting 
from loss of blood caused by hen1orrhage of the nose. 
:Jlrs. Taggart claimed con1pensation on the basis that the 
hemorrhage \Yas ·the result of accidental injury on August 
11, 1928. The Industrial Commission found that there 
was no ''accident'' and denied. the \Yiclow 's clain1. Th~ 
Supre1ne Court of Utah sustained the Comn1ission's de-
cision and among other things said : 
"The applicant failed to sustain the burden 
of proving that the hemorrhage was due to an 
accident. If it were conceded that the picking of 
the nose or sudden blowing or sneezing was itself 
such an accident for which compensation could 
be given and the 1nere fact that it 'happened dur-
ing the time of employment would satisfy the re-
quirenlent of being in ,the course of the en1ploy-
1nent, there nevertheless is no evidence in this 
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case to show that the hemorrhage occurred from 
any such causes.'' 
In ·the case of Thompson vs. Ind. Comm., 82 Utah 247, 
23 Pac. (2nd) 930,. Thompson was an employee of the 
Hylton Flour Mills at Ogden. His eyesight failed grad-
ually for several years. He applied f·or compensation, 
clain1ing that Hour dust got in his right eye on July 10, 
1932, while he was shaking a dust collector, and that this 
caused an ulcer of the eye to break one week later, result-
ing in almost .total blindness in the right eye. The Indus-
trial Commission denied compensation, because there was 
no ''accident.'' The Supren1e Court sustained the Com-
lniss~o~, and repeated the definiti•on of an ''accident'' 
':yhich we have already referred to. The Supren1e Court 
opinion n1entions that the Industrial Con1n1ission found 
that ''applicant has failed to sustain hy con1petent evi-
dence his burden of proof to shmv that the co~dition 
complained of 1\'as, either directly or indirectly due to 
an accident arising out of or in the course of his employ-
n1ent IYhile employed by the Hylton Flour Mills at Og-
den, Utah." The Supreme Court held that this was equiv-
alent to a finding ·that the applicant did' not sustain an 
injury by accident arising out of or in the course of his 
emplo~7lnent: 
"The ulti1na te fact to be found was whether 
or riot the applicant sustained an injury by acci-
dent arising out of or in the course of employ-
lnent. No direct finding was made on that deter-
n1inative issue. The finding is that the applicant 
failed to sus.tain the burden of proof. The burden 
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of proving that he su~talned un injury b~· aeeidt>nt 
in en1ployn1ent rested on the applicant. If hP 
failed to do so, the finding should have hP('ll 
against hiln. The finding as n1ade is equivalent 
to a finding .that the applicant did not sustain an 
injury by accident arising out of or in the course 
of his en1ployment. If the connnission had used 
such language. it ·would be a finding of the ulti-
mate fact in issue. In vie\Y ·of the conclusion we 
have reached on the facts, we are disposed .t1o trPat 
the finding as one to the effect that applicant did 
- not sustain an injury by accident in the course of 
or arising out of his e1nployn1ent. Banks v. Ind. 
Com., 74 Utah 166, 278 P. 58; Robinson v. Thomas, 
75 "Gtah -!-!6, 286 P. 625. 
Plaintiff cites and relies on the case of West 
L:. Standard Fuel Company (Utah), 17 P. (2nd) 
291, 292, as holding it is the duty of the trial court 
to make findings on all the rna terial issues raised 
by the pleadings, and that it is prejudicial error 
for it to fait to find on issues raised by the plead-
ings and the evidence. That is undoubtedly the 
general rule applicable to the making of findings 
of fact by a eourt, but the rule is not applicable in 
proceedings before the Industrial Commission. 
The statute does not require the n1aking of find-
ings of fact by the commission, _and this court 
has held that findings of fact are not legally es-
sential to a valid a ward, but has suggested that it 
is advi_sable t·o make iindings of ultimate facts in 
each case. ' ' 
Russell vs. Ind Co.mm., 86 Utah 306, 43 Pac. (2nd) 
1069. \Villiam Russell, who was an en1ployee of the Cmn-
bined Metals Reduetion Con1pany, got a blister on one 
of his toes about ~Iay 22, 1934. A week later he was 
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taken violently ill and on June 7, 1934, died from what 
the doctors concluded was t'oxic lymphangitis resulting 
from an infection at the site of the blister on his toe. 
His widow and children applied for compensation upon 
the theory that the blister on his toe and tht> resultant 
infection and dt_•ath "'ere caused by an accidental injury 
arising out ,of or in the course of his en1ployment. After 
a hearing the Industrial Cmnmission denied compensa-
tion and this denial -vvas sustained by the Supreme Court 
of Utah. In the Court's decision at page 313 is found 
the following language: 
"By express statutory provisions and by a 
long line of decisions of this court we are pre-
cluded fron1 ·weighing conflicting evidence and 
making findings of fact. That is the province of 
the con1mission. The duties ,of this court are 
limited to a determination- of questions of la''T· 
\Ye n1ay interfere vYith the COlllmission 's findings 
of fact in those cases where an award is granted 
without support of competent evidence, and, like-
'vise, where an award is denied against uncon-
tradicted evidence without any reasonable basis 
for disbelieving the san1e. In such cases a ques-
tion of law is presented for detern1ination; other-
wise, the findings of the comn1ission nTust be af-
firmed. Among the nun1erous cases from this 
jurisdiction which announce the foregoing doc-
trine are Hauser v. Ind. Con1., 77 Utah 419, 296 
P. 780; Parker v. Ind. Con1m., 78 Utah 509, 5 P. 
(2nd) 573; Peterson v. Ind. Comn1., 83 Utah 94, 
27 P. (2d) 31; and Osler v. Ind. Con1n1., 84 U. 
428, 36 P. (2d) 95. 
"In the instant case there Is no direct ev1-
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deiH'P as to when, how, or wlwre ~Lr. Russell rP-
ceiYed the blistPr on his toe. HP mav have n'-
eeiYed the injury "·hile he \Vas working ~t thP mill, 
but he 1nay. so far as the Pvidence discloses, have 
received it else,vht>re. \Y'hen any one of two or 
nwre inferences may reasonably be drawn fr01n 
the evidence, this court is not authorized to direct 
which inference n1ust be drawn, and, likewise, 
when, as in the instant case, it is so1newhat of a 
speculation as to where or how the deceased re-
ceived the injury coinplained of, this court is pre-
cluded from dire0ting an award. To entitle the 
plaintiff to prevail upon this review the evidence 
n1ust be such that the only reasonable inference 
permissible is that Mr. Russell received an acci-
dental injury growing out of or in the eourse of 
his emploJinent and that such injury resulfed in 
his death. The evidence before us does not meas-
ure up to that standard. The commission may well 
have entertained grave doubt as to when and 
where Mr. Russell received the blister on his toe. 
''In such case ~the order denying compansa.-
tion must be affirmed.'' 
In the case of Hutchings vs. Ind. Comnt., 96 Utah 
399, 87 Pac. (2nd) 11, toward the end of the court's opin-
ion is found the following : 
"The question before the court is whether 
the Industrial Commission upon the record before 
it, was required as a matter of law to award COn1-
pensation. In Globe Grain & Milling Company v. 
Ind. Comm., 57 Utah 192, 193 P. 642, 643, we 
st81ted the rule applicable here in the following 
language: 
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" 'This eourt has repeatedly held that it 
will not weigh the evidence, but will examine 
the same for the purpose only of determining 
whether there is any substantial competent 
evidence to sustain the findings or to support 
the award made by the comn1ission. * * * 
If there is such evidence the findings will be 
sustained * * * ' 
''And so it has been held in nun1erous cases 
that the decision of the Industrial Conm1ission 
will not be disturbed where the evidence was such 
that the Con1mission could reasonably find or 
conclude that the death or disability of the em-
ployee \Yas not the result of accidental injury aris-
ing out of or in the course of employment.'' 
In the case of Banks vs. Ind. Cmnm., 74 Utah 166, 
278 Pac. 58, the following language is found in the 
Court's opinion: 
''The evidence in thl· present case is not of 
sufficient weight and force to con1n1and a finding 
of accidental death. \\r e are not called upon to 
decide whe,ther it is sufficient to sustain an a\\Tard, 
had one been nuide, but assu1ning that it is suffi-
cient for such purpose it does not f,o1low that the 
com1nission was bound to n1ake an a\vard. '' 
Substantially this san1e language can appropriately 
lw used in referring to the case at bar. 
Practically all of the argu111ent contained in Plain-
tiff's brief is directed to the proposition that the Indus-
trial Comniissi,on should have believed l\1r. Dole's story 
and should have found and concluded that he did sustain 
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an ac-cidental injury on .Jlarch ~G. 1~)-H), as he alleged, 
and that sueh aeeid~ntal injury was the cause of the de-
taehed retina whieh destroyPd the sight of his right eye. 
This argtuuent Iuight haYe been proper if it had been 
made by Plaintiff's attonwy to the Industrial Conunis-
sion in an endeavor to persuade the Conunission to award 
con1pensation benefits to .Jlr. Dole, but it has no appli-
cation to the question now before the Supre1ne Court. 
Plaintiff's brief contained no citations and very little 
argtunent relating to the only question which is now in-
Yolved in this case, nainely ·what legal basis the Supreme 
Court would have for declaring that the Industrial Com-
mission was compelled to find in favor of the applicant 
on all points and to award him con1pensation. There is 
only one place in the Plaintiff's brief where we find 
mention made of this spe<;ific point. Toward the bottom 
of page 23 of Plaintiff's brief is found the following: 
"As was said in the outset Mr. Dole was 
alone, and apparently under some_ of the rulings 
of this Court 'that is an unfortunate thing for 
him.'' 
In that sentence Plaintiff's counsel gives a partial 
gliinmer of the legal rule prevailing in a situation such 
as is here involved. 
- . 
We admit that 1n the record there was testimony 
from Dr. \Vhite of Salt Lake City and in the depositions 
of the two Seattle doctors' testimony that Mr. Dole ~told 
them he had had a severe jolting while driving his auto-
mobile in the spring of 1946. But Dr. \Vhite stated that 
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the first tinw he saw Dole was 111 August 1946, which 
\Yat-l over four n1onths after the occurrence referred to 
on Redwood Road. The Seattle doctors first saw Dole 
'On February 26, 1947, which was eleven 1nonths after the 
alleged occurrence on Redwood Road. It clearly appears 
that anything 1\lr. Dole told these three doctors regard-
ing an alleged accidt>nt or severe shaking "·as by no 
nwans spontaneous and was not within a short time after 
the alleged occurrence. Oonsequently, any statements he 
n1ade to thosP doctors do not come within the res gestae 
rule. 
The Industrial Con1n1ission \vas justified in accept-
ing the conclusion to be drawn fron1 Dr. Saunders' tes-
timony that .I\Ir. Dole told hi1n nothing about having had 
an~· severe jolting and sudden los·s of vision the day 
prior to first consulting Dr. Saunders, instead of accept-
ing the hearsa~· staten1ents \Yhich 1\Ir. Dole made many 
nwnths later to the other doctors who \vere involved in 
his treatment. 
As \Ye have stated at other places in our brief, the 
question now before the Supren1e Court is whether the 
Industrial Comn1ission "·as required as a 1natter of lmY 
to find in Mr. Dole's favor and to a\Yard hin1 conlpen-
sation benefits. Inasmuch as the Industrial Comn1ission 
did not find in his favor and refused to award hin1 com-
pensation benefits, it is in1proper for Plaintiff's counsel 
to argue tha,t there is hearsay evidence which would havP 
supported an award, if one had been n1ade. 
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In conclusio!1 1nay we say that tlll~ Plaintiff, Frank 
E. Dole, is entitled to the s~·m pn thy of all of us hP<·ans<' 
of his unfortunate -condition. Apparently he has perntan-
ently lost the sight of his right p~·P. This loss of ~ight 
\Yas the result of a condition which the 1nedical experts 
have stated so1netin1es results frmn an accident and 
sometin1es results frmn conditions ·which cll'P not aeei-
dental. ~\fter a full and thorough hearing, the Indus-
trial Com1nission, under the po·wers which have been 
given to it by the Legislature, deternlined. that l\Ir. Dole 
did not sustain an accidental injury in the course of his 
employment as he had alleged. Under the same legisla-
tiYe provisions, that detern1ination and decision of the 
Industrial Commission is final and conclusive. 
For the foregoing reasons the Industrial Con1111is-
sion 's decision should be sustained. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GROVER A. GILES, 
Attorney General, 
F. A. TROTTIER, 
Attorneys for Defendants. 
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